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COMPETITION AND COMPATIBILITY WITH OPEN
SOURCE SOFTWARE
Zhaoli Meng, China Renmin University, Beijing, mengzhao@ruc.edu.cn
Sang-Yong Tom Lee, Hanyang University

Abstract
We use Hotelling’s linear city model to study asymmetric competition between open source and
proprietary software, where only one party - the proprietary software producer - aims at maximizing
the profit. We focus on the different compatibility choices of the proprietary software, which lead to
different network externality, and thus result in different profit for proprietary software producers. It
is found that the best compatibility strategy depends on the market coverage conditions: when the
market is fully covered, one-way compatibility is the best choice for the proprietary software. On the
other hand, when the market is not fully covered, two-way compatibility becomes the best strategy.
These results are not affected by the software quality. Furthermore, once the open source software
begins to purse the maximum market share, being two-way compatibility is the best strategy for both
open source and proprietary software. We also investigate the impact of the open source software. It is
shown that the proprietary software producer does not favor its proprietary rival changes to open
source software. Moreover, such change may not benefit the social welfare.
Keywords: Open source software, Compatibility, Competition.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Recent years have seen the striking success of open source software, which allows software
developers to use shared source codes, identify and correct errors, and redistribute the source codes
(O’Reilly 1999). One of the most famous and successful open source software projects is Linux,
which commands a third market share within the web server sector and is expected to grow to 41
percent of the market by 2005 (International Data Corporation IDC 2002). Another well known
example is Apache, which supports 67 percent of web sites on the Internet (Netcraft Web Server
Survey 2004). Other successful open source software products, such as Perl language and Sendmail,
have had significant market shares in their product categories (Lerner and Tirole 2002).
An interesting phenomenon is that facing open source competitors, proprietary software firms
may adopt different strategies in compatibility 1 . In some cases, like Windows versus Linux, the
proprietary software firm refuses to allow compatibility between its product and the open source
software. But as one can see from Internet Explorer, a proprietary software product can be two-way
compatible with an open source product such as Mozilla. Files created for IE users can be used
without any difficulty by users of the Mozilla browser and vice versa. In other cases, a proprietary
software firm may choose for its product to be one-way compatible, i.e., the files or programs
designed for the open source software product can be used by the proprietary software, but the files or
programs designed for the proprietary software may not be fully usable in the open source software.
Why would a proprietary software firm choose different strategies of compatibility in the face
of competition with open source software? How would market factors affect the profitability of a
proprietary software firm? Comparing with the case where the rival is another proprietary software
product, how would the profit, price and market share of the proprietary software change in the case
where the rival is open source software? Finally, what would be the welfare implications?
To answer these questions, we use Hotelling’s linear city model to analyze the competition
between an open source software product and a proprietary software product. Contrary to the
traditional Hotelling model, where both firms pursue maximum profit, only one party – the proprietary
software firm – tries to maximize its profit in our model. The open source software is passive because
the price is set at zero and its quality depends on the total number of consumers. Such asymmetry
requires obvious modification to the standard duopoly competition in the linear city model.
We find that when the market is covered, i.e., when all the consumers purchase one of the two
products, one-way compatibility is the best strategy. Two-way compatibility is the second best
strategy while incompatibility brings the lowest profit. However, when the market is not covered,
two-way compatibility becomes the best strategy. We also find that the price, market share and profit
for the proprietary software firm would be lower when the competitor is open source software than
when the competitor is another proprietary software product. Finally, we illustrate that contrary to
general belief, social welfare decreases with an increase in network externality.

2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The most widely investigated research question in past literature on open source software is to
identify the economic and non-economic motivations for individual developers to contribute to open
source software (Lerner and Tirole 2002). Another theme of prior research focuses on the quality of
open source software and the competition between open and proprietary software. An important
conclusion is that open source software is not necessarily inferior in quality to proprietary software
(Mishra et al. 2002, Kuan 2001, Johnson 2001, and Bessen 2002).Within this research theme, one
strand has been to consider the competition between open and proprietary software. Casadesus1
Katz and Shapiro (1998) defined compatibility as follows: “when two programs can communicate with one another and/or
be used with the same complementary system components, they are said to be compatible”.
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Masanell and Ghemawat (2003) modeled the competition between Windows and Linux as a dynamic
“mixed duopoly”, where a not-for-profit competitor interacts with a for-profit competitor. They
showed that as long as Windows’ pricing decision was not myopic, the results of the competition
would be either the coexistence of the two products or Linux being driven out of the market.
Our paper takes a similar approach but differs from Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat
(2003) in two aspects. First, the basic difference is in the research questions. Our work focuses on
strategic choices for compatibility – a topic seldom investigated in previous studies on open source
software. Second, we suppose consumers have heterogeneous preferences for products, which are
caused by two factors: 1) the learning cost of adopting a software product varies for different
consumers, 2) because of the difference in their past experiences, the extent of ‘lock-in’ is different
among consumers and their switching costs are different. The details of the model are present in
section 3.

3

THE BASIC MODEL

Consider a software market where two software products with same quality s are located at the
ends of a unit line. The open source software (O) is located at x=0 and the proprietary software (P) is
located at x=1. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the unit interval. They differ in their
preferences for the products, which is captured by their different locations. Specifically, for the
consumer located at x ∈ [0, 1] , she incurs utility cost tx if she uses the open source software because of
the difference between her ideal preference and the product specifications. Similarly, she incurs utility
cost t(1-x) if she chooses the proprietary software.
In the basic model, we assume that the two products are incompatible and the market is
covered, i.e., all the consumers choose to use one of the two software products. This is always true
when the benefit of the product is sufficiently large. If a consumer located at x adopts the open source
software, her net utility U o would be U o = s + kqo − tx + γ qo , where qo is the number of open source
users and k is the degree of contribution of each consumer to the quality of the open source software.
The last component γ qo refers to network externality. Following Katz and Shapiro (1985), network
externalities are linear to the number of users who adopt the same or compatible software products.
We assume that the open source software product is freely available, and there is no price component
in the net utility. Similarly, if the consumer located at x adopts the proprietary software, her net utility
U p is U p = s − t (1 − x) + γ q p − p , where q p denotes the number of proprietary software users and p
is the price of the proprietary software.
Suppose the consumer at xc ∈ [0, 1] is indifferent between the open and proprietary software
products, then from U o = U p , we have:

xc =

p +t −γ
p +t −γ
p +t −γ
, qo =
, qp = 1 −
.
2t − 2γ − k
2t − 2γ − k
2t − 2γ − k

The profit for the proprietary software firm π p is:

π ( p ) = pq p = p(1 − xc ) = p[1 −

p +t −γ
]
2t − 2γ − k .

By solving the profit maximization problem, we get:

t −γ − k
p* =
2
,
.

π* =

(t − γ − k ) 2
t −γ − k
M *p =
2[2(t − γ ) − k ]
4[2(t − γ ) − k ] ,
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The comparative statics presents three main results. First, higher t prompts consumers to stick
to the nearest product. Thus, the profitabity of the proprietary software will increase. Second, higher k
causes the quality of the open source software to increase, and it naturally decreases the profitability of
the proprietary software product. Third, and most interestingly, higher intensity of network externality
is disadvantageous to the proprietary software. Since the market share of the open source software is
bigger than that of the proprietary software ( M *p <

1
), the benefit of adopting the open source
2

software is bigger than that of the proprietary software for users near the cutoff point. Thus, higher γ
drives the potential consumer to deviate from the proprietary software.

4

COMPATIBILITY AND PROFITS

In the basic model, we have assumed the open and proprietary software products to be
incompatible. However, proprietary software firms may also choose for their products to be two-way
compatible or one-way compatible with open source software. How does this compatibility decision
change the profitability of proprietary software? To answer this question, in this section, we extend
our basic model to different settings of compatibility as well as to different market coverage
conditions. And we list the results in the following Tables.

π*

M *p

Market is covered

p*

Incompatibility

p* =

Compatibility

p* =

t−k
2

M *p =

t−k
2(2t − k )

π* =

One way compatibility

p* =

t−k
2

M *p =

t −k
2(2t − γ − k )

π* =

Table 1.

t −γ −k

M *p =

2

(t − γ − k ) 2
4[ 2 (t − γ ) − k ]

(t − k ) 2
4 (2t − k )

(t − k ) 2
4 ( 2t − γ − k )

π*

M *p

p*

Incompatibility

p* =

Compatibility

s
γs
p* = +
2 2(t −k −γ )

M* =

s
sγ
p*= +
2 2(t −k −γ)

M *p =

Table2.

π* =

The profit when market is fully covered

Market is not covered

One
compatibility

t −γ − k
2[2(t − γ ) − k]

way

s
2

M *p =

s
2(t − γ )

(t − k)s
2(t − 2tγ + γ k − tk)
2

(t − k ) s
2
2(t − 2tγ + γ k − tk )

The profit when market is not fully covered
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π* =

s2
4 (t − γ )

π* =

(t − k)2 s2
4(2tγ − γ k − t 2 + tk)(γ + k − t)

π* =

s 2 (t − k ) 2
4(t − γ )(t − γ − k ) 2

Table 1 lists the proprietary software firm’s optimal prices, market shares and profit with
different choices of compatibility when the market is covered. Table 2 lists those when the market is
not covered. By comparing the profit of the firm under different compatibility conditions, we claim the
following proposition.
Proposition 1
When the market is covered, one-way compatibility brings the highest
profit to the proprietary software firm followed by two-way compatibility and incompatibility.
However, when the market is not covered, two-way compatibility becomes the best strategy for the
proprietary software firm.
This result implies that the best compatibility strategy depends on market coverage conditions.
When the market is covered, the two products are under severe competition, i.e., one more user of one
product always comes with one less consumer of the other product. One-way compatibility allows
proprietary software users to share the network externality of open source users while preventing open
source software users from sharing the network externality of the proprietary software. Therefore, it
becomes the best strategy.
In contrast, when the market is not covered, one additional open source software user does not
decrease the number of proprietary software users. In this case, an increase in open source users can
benefit proprietary software users through network externality without hurting the market share of the
proprietary software. Therefore, two-way compatibility becomes a win-win strategy which can
increase the profit of the proprietary software while enhancing the market share of the open source
software.

5

‘PROPRIETARY VERSUS
VERSUS PROPRIETARY’

OPEN’

AND

‘PROPRIETARY

Today, more and more proprietary software products have to compete with open source
software products. How does the competition with open source software change the behavior of the
proprietary software firm compared to the case where the rival is another such firm? In this section,
we compare the optimal prices, market shares and profit when the rival changes from a proprietary
software firm to an open source software producer.
Let us consider a covered duopoly market where two symmetric proprietary software firms
compete. Here, we do not go through the details of the procedure because the results of two symmetric
firms under Hotelling’s model are well known. We simply claim the following proposition.
Proposition 2
Regardless of compatibility strategies, when the competitor is an open
source software product, the proprietary software firm faces lower price, lower market share, and
lower profit than when the rival is another proprietary software firm.
As Proposition 2 indicates, it is better for a proprietary software product to compete with
another proprietary software product than contend with open source software. When its rival changes
from a proprietary software product to open source software, the proprietary software firm is hurt in
every aspect.

6

WELFARE

In this section, we calculate welfare using the basic model and investigate how the
parameters γ , s, k and t affect social welfare. Social welfare in this model is the sum of sellers’ profit
and consumers’ surplus, which is presented as follows.
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x

c
（3t − 3γ − k）2 (2k − 3t + 4γ )
2t − 3γ − k (3t − 3γ − k )(3t − 4γ − k )
W = ∫ U o dx + ∫ U p dx + π p =
+s−
+
2
8[2(t − γ ) − k ]
2
2[2(t − γ ) − k ]
0
xc

1

Since

∂W
= 1 , it can be derived that welfare increases according to the increase in software
∂s

quality s, which is too intuitive to be interesting. However, other comparative statics results are very
complicated and not easy to be analyzed. Thus, we plot following figures to show how welfare
changes according to each parameter while assuming s = 0 .

Figure 1.

Welfare changes with respect to t and γ .

Figure 2.

Welfare changes with respect to k and γ .
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Observation 1:
Figure 1 presents that welfare increases with the increase in t and
welfare decreases with the increase in γ .
Observation 2:
Figure 2 shows that welfare increases with the increase in k and
welfare decreases with the increase in γ .
It is interesting that increase in network externality intensity γ decreases welfare. As
mentioned in section 3, the market share of the open source software is bigger than that of the
proprietary software. Therefore, increase in γ leads potential consumers to move from the proprietary
software to the open source software, and thus deceases the profit of the proprietary software
producer. Although network externality increases because some consumers move from the smaller
network to the bigger one, the figures show that the increase in network externality cannot compensate
the decrease in sellers’ profit and welfare decreases as γ increases.
Welfare increases with the increase in utility cost t. This is because t binds consumers to the
proprietary software. Therefore, the monopoly power of sellers of the proprietary software will
increase. As a result, sellers’ profits and welfare will increase. The increase of k enhances the quality
of the open source software increases. Therefore, the consumer surplus and the welfare increases.

7

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

We have used Hotelling’s model to investigate the competition between open and proprietary
software. By comparing optimal price, market share and maximum profit under each strategic choice
in compatibility, our study suggests that the best strategy for the proprietary software depends on
whether the market is covered. When the market is covered, one-way compatibility is the best strategy
for the proprietary software firm. When the market is not covered, however, two-way compatibility is
the best strategy as it can increase both the profit of the proprietary software and the market share of
the open source software. It is also shown that the proprietary software firm does not favor having an
open source software product as a rival in the market. The welfare results imply that increase in
network externality intensity γ lowers welfare. In contrast, increase in unit utility cost t increases
welfare.
The limitations of our analysis suggest several directions for future research. First, we have
assumed that the open source software equals the proprietary software in quality and the open source
software will increase in quality according to the number of users. Therefore, the market share of the
open source software is higher than that of the proprietary software. In further work, it would be
interesting to consider what happens once the market share of the proprietary software exceeds that of
the open source software. Second, we have assumed that the proprietary software firm seeks profit
maximization while the producer of the open source software passively reacts to the price set by the
proprietary software firm. For certain open source software, however, maximizing market share could
be the aim. Such case can be modeled in future work. Finally, for tractability, we have employed a
one-period model and assumed that the compatibility choice is on the proprietary software firm. In
future work, a two-stage model could be concerned, where the open source software producer may
change the compatibility strategy to win the maximum market share.
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